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REPLY TO GRAND COUNTY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Grand County states it "generally agrees with Emery County-Green River factual
statement," subject to "exceptions or additions." (Br. Appe. at 3.) This reply is limited to
Grand County's few "exceptions or additions." Most of these "facts," however, are
conclusory and unsupported by the record in these consolidated cases.
1.

It is true that Harvey W. Merrell provided an affidavit in support of Grand

County's motion for preliminary injunction, wherein Mr. Merrell asserted he was not
consulted and did not participate in the passage of H.B. 49. (Rl. 92-93.) However, Mr.
Merrell acknowledges he became aware of H.B. 49 before its consideration by the Senate,
and discussed it with "some legislators." (Rl. 93.) Further, Mr. Merrell's asserted lack of
extensive involvement in the preparation of H.B. 49 does not negate the fact that other
representatives of Grand County knew of it and were involved. Grand County had the means
and opportunity to influence the proposed legislation. (Rl. 89.) It is disingenuous for it to
contend it was blind-sided by H.B. 49.
In truth, Grand County did not take the annexation proposal seriously until after
the economic analysis was prepared, and it was at that time that it began objecting to the
conclusions of the analysis and filed the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent the annexation proposal from being decided by the eligible voters.
2.

Grand County asserts that, "Prior to the election, all parties, including the Utah

Lt. Governor, considered that a majority of registered voters (voters living in the area to be
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annexed and the annexing county) would be required to pass the proposition." The record
references do not support this assertion, however. Harvey Merrell claims in his affidavit that
certain unidentified persons told him the election would be measured on the basis of the
"registered voters." (R1.123.) This claim is hearsay. Further, the Lieutenant Governor did
not certify to the Governor the results of the annexation proposal for the reason maintained
by Grand County. Rather, the Lieutenant Governor did not certify the results to the Governor
merely because the Grand County Election Official and the Board of Canvassers for Grand
County did not certify to the Lieutenant Governor that the required majority of voters living
within the territory to be annexed had voted in favor of annexation. Neither in her Answer
(R2. 58) nor Affidavit (R2. 64) does the Lieutenant Governor express her opinion on the
interpretation of the voter approval statute.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Legislature is Not Required to Act by General Law in Connection with the
First Step of The Annexation Procedure Because It Is Voter Approval and Not
The Concurrent Resolution that Results in the Striking of Territory from Any
County.
A.

Grand County's Focus on the Concurrent Resolution Is Contrary to the
Applicable Law.

Grand County offers no response to Emery County and the City of Green River's
showing that the underlying statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-2-6, as amended by H.B. 49, is
a validly enacted general law. (See Br. App. at 21-28.) Instead, Grand County argues that,
within the annexation procedure established by H.B. 49, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-2-

2

6(2)(a)(ii)-which calls for passage of a concurrent resolution by each house of the
Legislature—violates art. XI, sec. 3 of the Utah Constitution. (Br. Appe. at 6-8.)
Grand County's focus on passage of the concurrent resolution as being determinative
of whether H.B. 49 is a general law clashes with Emery County and the City of Green River's
focus on passage of H.B. 49 as being determinative of whether H.B. 49 is a general law.
This difference in focus lies at the core of the dispute in this appeal.
Grand County's focus on passage of the concurrent resolution is flawed for several
reasons. First, by its plain terms, art. XI, sec. 3 does not require every legislative act
concerning an annexation proposal to be a general law. Rather, the Constitution requires any
legislative act prescribing the "conditions" by which territory may be stricken from any
county to be a general law. Thus, art. XI, sec. 3 speaks to the requirements of the underlying
annexation statute, which in this instance is H.B. 49 and not the concurrent resolution which
was passed pursuant to that statute.
Second, Grand County's focus on passage of the concurrent resolution is contrary to
the law applicable to evaluating challenged legislation under the "general law" provisions
of the Utah Constitution. The test there is whether the legislative classification is reasonable
in light of the purpose of the act. See Utah Farm Bureau Insur. Co. v. Utah Insur. Guaranty
Ass% 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977).
Passage of the concurrent resolution bears no relation to the definition of the
legislative classification. The statute creates a class consisting of cities/towns and counties

3

where the boundaries of the cities/towns cross county lines. See U.C.A. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(i)(AC).

There are currently five sets of cities/towns and counties that fall within this

classification. (See Affidavit of Finch Bingham, which is attached as Exhibit "G" to the
Principal Brief of Appellants.) Because the concurrent resolution does not define the
members of the class, it is irrelevant to the question of whether H.B. 49 is a general law.
Finally, Grand County's focus is flawed because it incorrectly assumes passage of the
concurrent resolution determines annexation. ("Control is therefore vested in the Legislature
and not in Article XI, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution." Br. Appe. at 6.) The trial court
based its ruling on the same faulty assumption. ("Giving the Legislature and the Governor
the last word on any county boundary change is something expressly prohibited by Utah's
Constitution." Rl. 134.)
In fact, however, H.B. 49 does not grant the Legislature "control" or "the last word"
on whether an annexation proposal is approved. Passage of the concurrent resolution is
merely one of three conditions that must be satisfied before an annexation proposal may be
presented to eligible voters for approval. H.B. 49 calls for approval by the Legislature and
Governor of the proposal before the matter may, after a satisfactory economic analysis, be
submitted to voters for approval. See U.C.A. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(i-iv). But for the conditions of
a satisfactory economic analysis and voter approval, there can be no annexation.
H.B. 49 clearly contemplates that voter approval is the key determinant when it states
the annexation "is approved" by a majority of the voters living in the area to be annexed and
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the annexing county. U.C.A. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B). The requirement of voter approval
is mandated by article XI, sec. 3, and is a part of the procedure enacted by H.B. 49. See
U.C.A. §§ 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)and 17-2-6(2)(b)(iii)(C).
Thus, Grand County incorrectly asserts the Legislature determines an annexation
proposal. Passage of the concurrent resolution is merely the first step among four steps that
must be satisfied before an annexation proposal may be certified as approved. It is in fact
the affected voters who determine annexation.
B.

The Legislature May Act by Concurrent Resolution, or Any Other Means
of Acting Not Prohibited by the Utah Constitution,

Grand County responds that "Utah has no constitutional provision permitting the
Legislature to exercise Legislative power by Joint Resolution." (Br. App. at 6.) The absence
of express authority is unavailing to Grand County, however.
The question is not whether the Utah Constitution expressly authorizes the Legislature
to act by resolution, but rather whether the Constitution proscribes such means of acting. The
Legislature may exercise all legislative power of the state except as limited by the state and
federal constitutions. Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P.2d 530, 534 (Utah 1935). Grand County
does not point to express or implied language in the Utah Constitution proscribing the
Legislature from acting by resolution.

To the contrary, the Constitution expressly

contemplates legislative action by resolution. Art. VI, sec. 24 generally requires the
presiding officer of each house to sign "all bills and joint resolutions passed by the
Legislature,.. ."
5

The implication of Grand County's contention is that the Constitution contemplates
only one means of acting, namely, passage of a law. This contention is negated by the plain
terms of the Constitution. For instance, whereas art. VI, sec. 22 sets forth procedures for the
passage of "every bill," art. VI, sec. 25 requires "all acts" of the Legislature to be officially
published. Similarly, no private or special "law" shall be enacted where a general "law" can
be applicable. Utah Const, art. VI, sec. 26.
Nor has this Court ever declared that passage of a legislative resolution creates a per
se violation of the Utah Constitution. Rather, this Court has merely held that a resolution of
the Utah Legislature is not legislation, and does not have the force or effect of law. See Salt
Lake City v. Tax Comrn'n of State of Utah, 813 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1991) (citing 1A
Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§ 29.04-.08 (4th ed. 1985)). Grand County agrees that
a legislative resolution "is not a law." (Br. Appe. at 5.)
Accordingly, because the Utah Constitution recognizes resolutions as a valid means
of exercising the legislative power, such resolutions cannot be attacked as per se violations
of the Constitution.
C.

Article XI, sec. 3 Does Not Require the Legislature to Act by General Law
When It Passes the Concurrent Resolution Pursuant to the Annexation
Procedure.

Grand County contends the Legislature must act by general law whenever it adopts
a concurrent resolution as part of the annexation procedure set forth in H.B. 49. (Br. Appe.
at 6-8.) It refers to art. XI, sec. 3 for this purported proposition. Article XI, sec. 3 states:
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No territory shall be stricken from any county unless a majority of the
voters living in such territory, as well as of the county to which it is
annexed, shall vote therefor, and then only under such conditions as
may be prescribed by general law.
Accordingly, the Utah Constitution does not require the Legislature to act by general
l^w when so acting does not result in the striking of territory from a county. It requires only
that any law prescribing the conditions for striking territory must assume the form of a
general law.
As shown above, passage of the concurrent resolution pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 17-2-6(2)(a)(l)(ii) does not result in the striking of territory from a county. Instead, it
results merely in the preparation of an economic analysis. As such, Grand County incorrectly
asserts that the concurrent resolution must be a general law.
To summarize, Grand County does not dispute the underlying statute, H.B. 49, is a
valid general law. Because its and the trial court's exclusive focus on passage of the
concurrent resolution is flawed, the trial court should be reversed on the constitutionality of
H.B. 49.
IJL

The Trial Court Correctly Held That an Annexation Proposal Brought Under
Section 17-2-6(2) Requires Approval by A Majority of Those Voters Living in
The Territory to be Annexed.
Grand County cross-appeals the trial court's ruling that the annexation statute's

provision for voter approval on the basis of a "majority of voters living in the area proposed
for annexation" limits the franchise to those persons who live in the area to be annexed and
who actually vote on the annexation proposal. (Br. Appe. at 9-10.)
7

In its ruling, the trial court stated:
The statute in question authorizes a change in the county
boundary if, among other things, the change is approved by a "majority
of voters living in the area proposed for annexation." "Voter" can
mean either a person who actually votes or a person who is legally
entitled to vote. Grand County contends that the addition of the words
"living in the area" suggests an intent to include in the group from
which a majority must be drawn every person "living in the area" who
could vote. Emery County and Green River contend that the legislature
used those words simply to narrow and define the universe of voters
from which a majority must be drawn.
The court agrees with Emery County and Green River. The use
of "living in the area" acts to limit the franchise to those who live in the
area proposed for annexation. It would be a simple matter for the
legislature, if it so desired, to state that the proposal must be atpproved
by a majority of all persons living in the affected area who did or could
vote. Alternately, it could have used the language interpreted in City
of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954 (Utah ] 996), "a
majority of registered voters."
The court concludes the plain meaning of the word "voters" in
this statute is people who actually vote. The court accordingly
determines that the proposal did receive the required electoral approval.
[Rl. 131-32.]
A.

Grand County's Resort to Extrinsic Evidence Is Improper Because the
Voter Provision of the Annexation Statute Is Not Ambiguous.

Under H.B. 49, after the completion of a satisfactory economic analysis, the
annexation is approved by "a majority of the voters living in the area proposed to be
annexed", and "a majority of the voters living in the proposed annexing county." U.C.A. §
17~2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B). Grand County contends the meaning of this voter approval statute
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should be determined from "the roll of registered voters" within the territory to be annexed
and the annexing county. (Br. Appe. at 10.)
In support of its construction of the voter approval statute, Grand County refers to a
non-enrolled draft of H.B. 49, the purported understanding of "all parties, including the
County Clerks, and Lt. Governor," the language of Section 17-2-8, as amended by H.B. 49,
and art. XI, sec. 3 of the Utah Constitution. (Br. Appe. At 9-10.) In other words, to interpret
Section 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B), Grand County resorts to factors other than the statute itself.
Grand County's proposed construction is improper as a matter of law. It is well
established that, faced with a question of statutory construction, this Court first examines the
plain language of the statute. See Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.2d 257,
259 (Utah 1998). The Court will not look beyond the plain language unless it finds the
statute is ambiguous. Id. See also, World Peace Movement of Am. V. Newspaper Agency
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994) ("only when we find ambiguity in the statute's
language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy
considerations."). Grand County does not allege, much less show, that Section 17-26(2)(a)(iv)(A-B) contains an ambiguity. As such, it may not resort to the extrinsic evidence
described above.
In fact, the statute is not ambiguous on its face. The relevant language, "majority of
the voters," "living in the area proposed to be annexed", and "living in the proposed
annexing county," is not susceptible to different meanings. See State v. Beason, 2000 UT
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App 109, Tf 19,2 P.3d 459,463. Indeed, Grand County offers no alternative construction of
Section 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B) on the basis of its plain language (and without resort to
extrinsic evidence). Accordingly, it must be presumed Grand County does not contend the
plain language is susceptible to different meanings.
Because Grand County does not show the statute is ambiguous, it may not resort to
extrinsic evidence in support of its construction of the statute.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Construed the Voter Approval Statute.

The annexation statute is clear and uses the term "majority of voters living in the area
proposed for annexation" to describe the voters who are entitled to vote for or against the
proposition. SeeU.C.A. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B). Black's Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines
the term "voter", in pertinent part, as follows:
Voter. The word has two meanings - a person who performs act
of voting, and a person who has the qualifications entitling him
to v o t e . . . .
Thus, the term "voter" simply means an individual residing in the City of Green River in
Grand County who voted in the annexation election.
Pursuant to the statute's express terms, only the voters living in the area to be annexed
could vote in the election. Accordingly, the Grand County election judges permitted only
persons residing in the City of Green River to vote in the annexation proposition election.
Of these eligible voters, 35 voters voted in favor of the proposition and 17 voters voted
against it. (Rl. 132; R2. 4.) Grand County does not dispute this conclusion.
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Grand County's assertion that the number of "yes" votes on the proposition must be
measured against the total number of "registered voters" in the Green River City precinct
of Grand County is precluded by the plain language of the statute. Nowhere does Section 172-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B) ever refer to the eligible voters as "registered voters."
This Court has been careful to literally construe statutory election language. Thus, in
the absence of a specific requirement that the vote be measured on the basis of the
"registered voters," such a requirement will not be read into an election statute. See, e.g.,
South Jordan City v. Sandy City, 870 P.2d 273 (Utah 1994) (municipal dissolutions under
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 10-2-701); City of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954

(Utah 1996) (township elections under UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-502).
In Nowers v. Oakton 169 P. 2d 108 (1946), this Court construed the term " a vote by
the majority of all the legal voters of such county..." to require only a majority vote of voters
voting in the election. The construction of the election statute at issue in Nowers is identical
to the construction Emery County and the City of Green River place on Section 17-26(2)(a)(iv)(A-B).
Using the voter registration list to arrive at the number of eligible voters would
impose an artificially high standard on the measurement of the election because a large
number of "registered voters" do not reside in the area to be annexed.
Filed along with Emery County and the City of Green River's Petition for Election
Review are affidavits executed by Grand County election judges who state that twenty
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persons on the voter registration roll did not reside in the area to be annexed at the time of
the election. (R2. 37-42.) Additionally, affidavits were provided from sixteen former
residents of the area who no longer reside in the area to be annexed, and two persons who
are listed on the Green River Precinct Voter Registration list who have never lived in the City
of Green River. (R2. 19-36.) When H.B. 49 was enacted the Legislature undoubtedly was
aware of the inherent inaccuracy of voter registration lists.
Consequently, separate from the lack of statutory authority, Grand County's suggested
construction of the voter approval statute is problematic. It presents serious obstacles to a
fair and effective measurement of the election results since a person could be listed as a
registered voter in an area to be annexed where he or she does not reside. As shown above,
persons are often registered to vote in a precinct where they do not reside.
Article XI, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution employ different language to
describe eligible voters. Article XI, sec. 2 defines the number of voters required to approve
a change in county from one place to another as follows: ". . . two thirds of the qualified
electors." This is to be contrasted with the succeeding section where a super majority is not
intended to be required. Article XI, sec. 3 defines the number of voters required to change
county boundaries as follows: "a majority of the voters living in such territory." Section 172-6(2)(a)(iv)(A-B) uses the same language as article XI, sec. 3, namely, a "majority of the
voters." If the Legislature intended a super majority requirement, it would have specified it.
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Accordingly, the trial court's ruling with respect to the construction of the voter
approval statute should be affirmed. Grand County's cross-appeal should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Emery County and the City of Green River respectfully
request that the trial court's ruling that H.B. 49 is unconstitutional be reversed, and the matter
be remanded for the entry of appropriate orders certifying the results of the election on the
annexation proposal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of June, 2001.
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